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Public Health Versus Civil Liberties:
Washington State Imposes HIV Surveillance
and Strikes the Proper Balance
Robin Sheridan*
In Washington State, there are approximately 8,500 recorded
cases of AIDS1 or asymptomatic HIV.' It is estimated that there are
an additional 6,000 to 8,000 HIV infected individuals residing in the
state.3 In 1996, HIV was responsible for the deaths of 15% of men
ages 35-44, 13% of deaths among men ages 25-34, and 4% of deaths of
women ages 25-34.' According to the Center for Disease Control
(CDC), efforts to stop the spread of the disease are inhibited by indi-
viduals who remain unaware of their HIV status.5
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1. AIDS is a syndrome of the immune system characterized by opportunistic diseases. The
syndrome is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which is transmitted by
exchange of body fluids (notably blood and semen) through sexual contact, sharing of contami-
nated needs, accidental needle sticks, contact with contaminated blood or transfusion of
contaminated blood/blood products. STEDMANS'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 39 (25th ed. 1995).
2. King County Pub. Health, Facts About... HIV Reporting in Washington State (visited
Feb. 23, 2001) <http://www.metrokc.gov/health/apu/namerep/qna.pdf >.
3. Id.
4. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE RULE ANALYSIS
PROPOSED REGULATORY AMENDMENTS ESTABLISHING A NAME-BASED HIV REPORTING
SYSTEM, WITH CONVERSION OF NAME TO CODE 1 (1999) (citing to Washington vital
statistics).
5. See generally Center for Disease Control and Prevention, DRAFT Guidelines for National
HIV Case Surveillance, Including Monitoring for HIV Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency
Disease Syndrome (AIDS) (visited Feb. 23, 2001) <http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/img/med/
reporting.pdf>.
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On July 14, 1999, after extensive deliberations, the Washington
State Board of Health unanimously voted to implement a system of
HIV case reporting in the state.6 The objectives of this plan include
monitoring the spread of the disease and connecting HIV positive
individuals with medical care and counseling.7 On September 1, 1999,
the new regulations in the Washington State Administrative Code
went into effect.' The regulations mandate that health officials report
all cases of certain specified infectious diseases,9 including asympto-
matic HIV infection, to local health departments." Upon the adop-
tion of the HIV surveillance program, Washington became the thirty-
fourth state to mandate some form of HIV case reporting."
Although Washington is not alone in its regulatory effort to stop
the spread of AIDS, the recently adopted regulations stand apart from
those imposed in other states. Among the states that have HIV
surveillance programs, the majority mandate HIV case reporting by
patient name. By contrast, Washington's HIV surveillance system
achieves the proper balance between public health and civil liberties:
by using a hybrid system of both unique identifiers and patient names
in HIV tracking, Washington's health regulations protect the privacy
interests of HIV infected individuals in a manner that encourages
testing while still promoting AIDS awareness and maintaining accu-
rate data to aid in controlling the epidemic."
Under Washington's model, the reporting of HIV-infected indi-
viduals' names is limited to the local level.13 Names are provided to
county health officials who are responsible for encrypting patient med-
ical data into codes.'4 Once codified, the data is released to state
6. Larry Keil & Susie McIntyre, The "Washington Model" for HIV Case Reporting (visited
Feb. 23, 2001) <http://www.metrokc.gov/health/apu/namerep/washmod.htm>.
7. King County Pub. Health, supra note 2.
8. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-100-016, 246-100-036, 246-100-041, 446-100-072, 246-
100-076, 246-100-206, 246-100-207, 246-100-208, 246-100-209, 246-100-236 (1999).
Throughout this Comment, these provisions will be referred to collectively as "the regulations."
9. Under the regulations, other reportable conditions include: tuberculosis, whooping
cough, measles, rabies, plague, cholera, hepatitis, and syphilis. Currently, over fifty infectious
diseases are reportable in Washington state.
10. Reportable Diseases and Conditions, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-076(5) (1999)
("Effective September 1, 1999, health care providers are required to report to the local health
department all cases of HIV infection consistent with the provisions of WAC 246 -100, provided
the HIV-infected person receives health care or treatment services on or after September 1, 1999,
regardless of the date of initial diagnosis. Local health officials will report asymptomatic HIV
infection cases to the state health department according to a standard code developed by the state
health department.").
11. King County Pub. Health, supra note 2.
12. See generally WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4.




officials who are responsible for reporting to the CDC."5 This proce-
dure, which is new among states that employ methods of encryption,
eliminates the possibility that sensitive medical data will be released to
state government officials.16
This Comment examines the controversy surrounding the
Washington HIV surveillance system in light of a long-standing con-
flict between public health concerns and civil liberties. 7 Part I of this
Comment briefly describes the inception of the AIDS epidemic. Part
II focuses on AIDS legislation and the justifications for surveillance.
Part III discusses the tension between public health and civil liberties.
Part IV describes AIDS' social stigmatization and deterrence. Part V
addresses the nature of medical information and the potential for
government misuse. Part VI describes the types of HIV surveillance
available and the benefits and burdens which accompany both track-
ing systems. Part VII addresses the Washington State approach to
HIV surveillance and the process by which the Washington legislature
drafted the regulations.
I. AIDS: THE INCEPTION OF A WORLDWIDE CRISIS
In June of 1981, the first AIDS cases were reported. 8 "From
1981 on, the number of AIDS cases doubled every six months, con-
centrated largely but not exclusively in the urban centers of New
York, Miami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco."" After receiving an
increasing number of reports of pneumonia and rare forms of cancer,
the CDC reported the cause to be a transmissible agent spread in a
manner similar to hepatitis B.2' The CDC recognized this group of
diseases as what is currently known as AIDS."
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge., Jr., The "Names Debate": The Case for
National Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV. 679, 682 (1998).
18. J. Michael Howe & Peter C. Jensen, An Introduction to the Medial Aspects of HIV Dis-
ease, in AIDS AND THE LAW 1, 3 (David W. Webber ed., 1997).
19. June E. Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease, in AIDS AND THE
LAW 17, 19 (Harlon L. Dalton et a]. eds., 1987) ("[I]n 1987 more new cases of AIDS were diag-
nosed than in the prior six years. By December 1986, nearly 50,000 people with AIDS had been
reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). More than half of them (27,909) had died,
and indeed the mortality rate is almost 80 percent for people in whom AIDS was diagnosed more
than two years ago.").
20. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Trends Update on Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 507,
508 (1982).
21. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Trends Hepatitis B Virus Vaccine
Safety: Report of an Inter-Agency Group, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 465
(1982). See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CDC's ROLE IN HIV AND AIDS PREVEN-
TION, UPDATE 1 (1998) (reporting that after initial reports of opportunistic infections, CDC
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AIDS typically appears in the young adult population.23 The
average age at the time of diagnosis is thirty-six.24 The majority of
HIV infections result from unprotected sexual intercourse with an
HIV infected partner or from sharing needles with HIV infected
persons. However, the face of AIDS is changing. AIDS is not, as
previously thought, a syndrome isolated within the homosexual com-
munity. Rather, AIDS has infiltrated ethnic minority populations25
and increased rapidly among heterosexuals.26 Although incidences of
infection are more prevalent in men than women, cases among women
are rising steadily. 7 As HIV infection spreads among the female pop-
ulation, the virus finds its way into another generation as women
transmit the virus to their infants prior to birth.28
Diseases that have virtually no effect on healthy individuals
prove deadly to infected individuals.29 HIV results in progressive
damage to a person's immune system.3" The virus leaves the body
susceptible to numerous opportunistic infections that result in
immunosuppression.31 The culmination of this damage results in a
manifestation of AIDS and, ultimately, death.32
In addition to a grueling process of psychical deterioration,
victims of AIDS often suffer from social and emotional torment.
Infected persons may fear social stigmatization and various forms of
implemented surveillance program for the disease, now referred to as AIDS. The CDC created a
case definition for the syndrome and cases were directly reportable to the center. However, as
AIDS spread, surveillance became a task for the states. State health departments forward sur-
veillance results to the CDC, which produces a national date service.); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al.,
National HIV Case Reporting in the United States A Defining Moment in the History of the
Epidemic, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162 (October 16, 1997) (emphasizing that the United States
is at a critical point in the AIDS epidemic where it is necessary to install a national HIV surveil-
lance system).
22. Center for Disease Control, supra note 20, at 507.
23. King County Pub. Health, supra note 2.
24. Id.
25. See Howe & Jensen, supra note 18, at 10 (emphasizing that the death rates among Afri-
can American men and women are significantly higher than those among whites in the same age
group).
26. See generally Osborn, supra note 19, at 23-24.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Howe & Jensen, supra note 18, at 9; see also Frederic C. Kass, Schoolchildren with
AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 66, 67 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) (discussing the incep-
tion of Pediatric AIDS and the number of schoolchildren infected).
29. Richard Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 28, 29 (Harlon L.
Dalton et al. eds., 1987) ("HIV invades and kills the white blood cells, known as T-helper cells,
that are primarily responsible for preventing infectious diseases .... No treatment permanently
reverses the suppression of the immune system; no vaccine prevents infection.").
30. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 1.
31. Howe & Jensen, supra note 18, at 4.
32. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 1.
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prejudice. These fears lead to feelings of isolation, depression, and a
multiplicity of other psychological problems.3
In 1995, the AIDS epidemic reached a critical point as the num-
ber of reported AIDS cases exceeded one-half million. 4 Today, the
CDC reports the number of HIV/AIDS-infected individuals in this
country to be 753,907. 3' As the crisis continues, it is critical that states
impose tracking systems in order to control and monitor the spread of
the epidemic.
II. AIDS LEGISLATION
State and national governments responded to the AIDS crisis
through legislative measures.36 In 1984, nationwide AIDS case report-
ing began.3 7 Reporting the names of individuals with AIDS became a
major part of a national effort to understand and control the AIDS
epidemic.3 8 Today, every state has statutes or regulations requiring
laboratories to report the names of individuals with AIDS to health
departments.39 AIDS surveillance is widely accepted as one of a
number of tools necessary to thwart the spread of the disease.4°
In addition to the necessity for health services to halt the spread
of AIDS, infected individuals' short period of survival is thought to
outweigh any potential social risks stemming from AIDS case report-
ing.4' Additional justification stems from the fact that individuals
with AIDS are already part of the health care system.42 The rationale
is that reporting the names of people with AIDS will not have a
deterrent effect on people currently receiving medical care.
Traditional AIDS surveillance focused on the most advanced
stage of infection, which usually develops ten years after initial HIV
33. See Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Healch Care: Lessons from HIV Testing, 61
ALB. L. REV. 831 (1998).
34. Howe & Jensen, supra note 18, at 7.
35. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 12 HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE
REP. MID-YEAR 2000 1, 6 (2000). These statistics show incidence of AIDS through June 2000.
Adult and adolescent AIDS cases composed 745,103 of this total. Children under the age of 13
composed 8,804 of reported cases.
36. Bernadette Pratt Sadler, When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy Rights: Mandatory
HIV Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REV. 195, 199 (1992);
Lawrence Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, Legislative and Regulatory
Policy in the United States, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1621 (1989).
37. King County Pub. Health, supra note 2.
38. Gostin et al., supra note 21, at 1162.
39. Id. at 1163.
40. See generally Matthew V. Sharp, HIV Names Reporting Rears Its Ugly Head, BAY AREA
REPORTER, Nov. 20, 1997, available at <http://www.actupgg.org/BAR/art112097.html>.
41. Gostin et al., supra note 21, at 1162.
42. See Sharp, supra note 40.
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infection. However, due to the length of time between transmission
and the manifestation of AIDS, traditional surveillance statistics
revealed only a small portion of the true picture of the epidemic. 43 It
became obvious that, in order to truly grasp the extent of this
epidemic, it was necessary to track HIV infection as well.
Advances in medical technology, such as Highly Active Anti-
Retroviral Therapy (HAART), provided an additional justification for
tracking HIV infections. HAART drastically changed the quality of
life for people with HIV. Indeed, it brought about the very first
decline in annual AIDS-related death rates since the inception of the
disease. 44 Thus, as the medical field gained a greater understanding of
the role HIV plays in the development of AIDS, the focus of case
reporting shifted from tracking the appearance of opportunistic infec-
tions to identifying immunosuppression.
45
Today, the focus of HIV reporting laws is not only persons who
have full-blown AIDS, but also those who suffer from asymptomatic
HIV infection.46 In general, HIV reporting requires laboratories and
health officials to report new HIV infections to state health authorities.
HIV surveillance focuses on the earliest stages of infection. One major
advantage in identifying infected populations sooner is that health
departments are then more likely to link HIV positive individuals to
health services, education, and partner notification programs. 47 Early
tracking also provides a clearer picture of the number of people cur-
rently living with HIV, allowing officials to monitor the way in which
the disease is spreading.
Despite the rationales offered in support of HIV case reporting,
the issue continues to ignite political controversy.4" While AIDS
reporting is widely accepted, opponents of HIV reporting assert that
43. Gostin, supra note 21, at 1163.
44. Anna Forbes, Special Report "Names" Versus "Unique Identifiers": The "How" of HIV
Case Reporting, SIECUS REP., Feb. 1, 1998, at 3, available in WL 32496867 (explaining that, in
the advent of HAART, state AIDS data does not properly illustrate the full scope of the
epidemic).
45. TEXAS DEP'T OF HEALTH, RECOMMENDATIONS ON HIV INFECTION REPORTING 1
(Jan. 1998) ("As experts gained a greater understanding of the underlying mechanisms of disease
development, the AIDS case definition and focus of disease surveillance shifted from tracing
diagnoses of opportunistic infections [sic] (1982 case definition) to using laboratory evidence of
severe immunosuppression (CD4+ below 200 microliters per decaliter of blood) as a marker of
the beginning of AIDS .... ").
46. Sadler, supra note 36, at 196 (explaining that during the initial period of HIV infection,
individuals do not display physically apparent symptoms of disease).
47. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 17, at 712 (arguing that a national system of HIV
surveillance will provide a better understanding of the epidemic, assist in prevention, and enable
better distribution of public health services).
48. See discussion infra Parts IV & V.
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its potential for harm outweighs public health concerns.49 Opponents
argue that fewer people will get tested due to their fear of public dis-
closure should they test positive for HIV.50
III. PUBLIC HEALTH VERSUS CIVIL LIBERTIES
It is the duty of health authorities to take measures to protect the
public health. "Treating persons already ill, providing preventative
therapies for individuals who came into contact with infectious agents,
investigating and halting outbreaks, and removal of harmful health
exposures are key ways public health officials protect the public."'"
Tracking systems are traditional weapons against a wide range of
infectious diseases.52 Such systems aid prevention by linking infected
persons to medical resources and counseling. Despite this, govern-
ment tracking systems have always appeared suspect to civil liberties
organizations and even to some medical professionals.5 3
Because HIV is an infectious disease, public health officials assert
that it must be reported in the same manner as tuberculosis and many
sexually transmitted diseases. Furthermore, HIV case reporting will
result in increased testing of partners, earlier treatment, and improved
tracking of the epidemic. Despite these arguments in favor of includ-
ing HIV within a long list of reportable conditions, HIV case reporting
remains an extremely divisive issue.
Opponents of HIV case reporting put forth a number of compel-
ling arguments against the imposition of a tracking system to control
AIDS. They assert (1) that the government will misuse this sensitive
data to deny insurance and employment to HIV positive persons, (2)
that public knowledge of one's HIV status will result in social stigma-
tization and public persecution, and (3) that case reporting will deter
individuals who are at risk from getting tested and seeking medical
care. The thrust behind these arguments is the same: AIDS is dif-
ferent. Unlike other diseases, public knowledge of one's HIV status
may be detrimental to an individual's personal life and emotional well-
being."
49. See generally Gostin & Hodge, supra note 17.
50. Warren King, Amid Protests, State Approves Reporting of HIV Patients, SEATTLE
TIMEs, July 15, 1999, at B1.
51. Washington State Department of Health, Conditions and Diseases Reportable to Public
Health Agencies, Revision of Notifiable Conditions in Washington State (visited November 23,
1999) <http://www.doh.wa.gov/OS/Policy/nc.htm>.
52. Id.
53. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 17, at 684-85.
54. See generally Mary C. Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States: Reflec-
tions on the Nature of Prejudice, 34 VILL. L. REV. 909 (1989).
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IV. SOCIAL STIGMATIZATION AND DETERRENCE
As the AIDS epidemic grew, the fear of AIDS transformed into a
fear of people with AIDS.5" The highly publicized case of Nushawn
Williams, a New York resident accused of intentionally transmitting
HIV to several women through unprotected intercourse, gave rise to a
public perception that HIV positive individuals are sexual predators
and, in some cases, criminals.56 Additionally, the prevalence of AIDS
in the homosexual community and among intravenous drug users fur-
ther increased public condemnation of victims of the disease. 7
The notion that AIDS is a highly contagious disease also contri-
butes to the victimization of HIV infected persons.5" Most studies
show, however, that AIDS is not unusually contagious, nor is it spread
by casual contact.59 Unlike tuberculosis, which may be transmitted
through the air, HIV transmission requires intimate bodily contact.60
Specifically, the virus is generally spread through the exchange of
blood or semen, and, therefore, it is not easily transmissible.6'
Social stigmatization, which may result from public knowledge of
an individual's HIV status, deters people from getting tested.62
Women whose HIV tests indicate the use of controlled substances fear
losing custody of their children.63 Immigrant populations fear that a
55. Id. See also Jean R. Stermlight, Negligence and Intentional Torts, in AIDS AND THE
LAW 347, 362-63 (David W. Webber ed., 1997) (discussing legal claims for emotional distress
as a result of a fear of HIV infection and possible development of AIDS).
56. See, e.g., Lisa Holewa, Leaked Names Prompt Inquiry; AIDS Confidentiality Brought
into Question, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 1996, at 23A (discussing an incident in Florida where a
list of approximately 4,000 AIDS patients was stolen and sent to two newspapers); Richard
Perez-Pena, Town Finds AIDS Is No Longer Someone Else's Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1997, at
B8 (discussing the case of Nushawn Williams, the Jamestown, New York resident who, despite
his knowledge of his HIV-positive status, had sex with dozens of young women, infecting at least
twelve of them); Ian Ith, Man Accused of Infecting Women with HIV, SEATTLE TIMES, March
21, 2000, at B1.
57. See Dunlap, supra note 54, at 910-12.
58. Sadler, supra note 36, at 209.
59. Green, supra note 29, at 33.
60. Sadler, supra note 36, at 197 (listing various modes of HIV transmission including "sex-
ual contact... perinatal exposure, breast feeding, and exposure to blood or blood products, such
as by transfusion or needle sharing.").
61. Green, supra note 29, at 33-35. Green states that "[HIV is] fragile and easily killed out-
side the body. In fact, the virus is destroyed by standard solutions of almost all common
disinfectants, such as hydrogen peroxide, bleach, Lysol, or alcohol." Id. Green also discusses
the difficulty of HIV transmission despite prolonged exposure. Id.
62. See Scott Burris, Studying the Legal Management of HIV-Related Stigma, AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST, April 1999, at 861-64.
63. Id. at 867 (citing Penelope Ploughman, Public Policy Versus Private Rights: The Medi-
cal, Social, Ethical, and Legal Implications of the Testing of Newborns for HIV, 10 AIDS & PUB.
POL'Y J. 182, 193 (1996)). See also Regina Montague, For This Peer Advocate, AIDS Walk Is a
Giant Step, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 2000, at B4 (chronicling the life of Matilde Garcia, an HIV
infected drug user who transmitted the virus to her baby, but radically altered her lifestyle in an
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positive HIV test will result in deportation.64 In some cases, knowl-
edge of a positive HIV test may incite episodes of domestic violence in
an abusive relationship. 6 Homosexual men have been denied housing
solely because of the fear that they may have AIDS. 6  Entire families
have been evicted from their homes when one member is discovered to
have AIDS.67 Work environments have turned hostile and aggressive
when the knowledge of one's HIV status is revealed. 68 Infected indi-
viduals have been terminated from employment or denied positions.6 9
HIV infected individuals have also been denied insurance coverage
and suffered economic drain as a result of their illness.7°
Furthermore, public fear of HIV and AIDS is not merely direct-
ed at victims of the disease. This fear extends beyond the infected
individual to those with whom an AIDS or an HIV victim closely
associates. Children who have been exposed to HIV and AIDS are
alienated from their playmates and denied access to public education,7'
while family members find themselves ostracized and subject to vio-
lence and torment.
Due to these extensive social risks, legislation must be sensitive
to the dramatic and complex set of emotions closely involved in the
testing process. 73  The decision to get tested for HIV is not a casual
one. Rather, this decision takes place "within a context of anxiety,
effort to retain custody of her son).
64. Burris, supra note 62, at 867.
65. Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to Resur-
gence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 111,
167-68 (1994) (noting that, especially in relationships that are abusive, knowledge of a woman's
HIV status may lead her heterosexual partner to assume that the woman was infected through
sexual or drug-related activities that took place outside the context of their relationship).
66. See Poffv. Caros, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. 1987).
67. See Pam Belluck, In Small Town, U.S.A., AIDS Presents New Set of Hardships, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at Al.
68. See Stephen Koepp, Living with AIDS on the Job; As Lawsuits Arise, Companies Are
Giving Victims a Chance, TIME, Aug. 25, 1986, at 48 (referring to the case of Paul Cronan, a
truck driver who was threatened with death after revealing his AIDS status to his coworkers at
the phone company).
69. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
70. See Mark Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW 185, 191-92 (Harlon L. Dalton
et al. eds., 1987) (arguing that legislative attention should be directed at insurance regulation in
an effort to devise a system in which the expense of AIDS-related medical treatment is properly
allocated).
71. See Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. N.J. 1990).
72. See Myra MacPherson, The Children and the Flames of Fear; In Florida, a Family at the
AIDS Flash Point, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1987, at B1 (describing how a Florida family had its
home firebombed after the community discovered that two of the family's hemophiliac children
were HIV-positive).
73. Burris, supra note 62, at 856.
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stigma, subordination, and struggle in the various fields of the individ-
ual's life activities.
74
Successful legislative measures and surveillance programs recog-
nize and account for social stigmatization and deterrence by protecting
the privacy interests of infected persons. These protections should
include penalties for intentional or unintentional disclosure and
mechanisms for keeping the identity of patients confidential. Without
such protections, the social risks involved in the testing process could
be perceived as outweighing the benefit of medical care and treat-
ment.75
V. THE NATURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR GOVERNMENT MISUSE
Mistrust of the government poses a significant barrier to
developing successful measures to stop the spread of HIV infection.
Because a person's medical profile is an extremely private and intimate
matter, many people believe that the government will misuse this sen-
sitive medical data.76 Among the HIV infected population, which is
partially composed of various marginal societal groups, suspicions of
potential government wrongdoing are not uncommon.77 Gay political
activist groups, who place great emphasis on the right to privacy, view
the AIDS crisis as a threat to political gains and "a huge obstacle to
further liberation."7" Intravenous drug users, who already face mar-
ginalization due to the criminal nature of their lifestyle, are automat-
ically mistrustful of government.
Medical professionals also consistently display discomfort with
mandatory reporting schemes. Inherent in the doctor-patient relation-
ship is an understanding that information exchanged between doctors
and patients is confidential. HIV surveillance requires doctors to
breach this confidential relationship, revealing the patient's private
medical information to the state.79
Opponents of HIV and AIDS data collection point to several
widely publicized incidents of informational misuse. For example, a
county health worker in Florida brought home lists of HIV and AIDS
patient names in order to determine the medical status of potential
74. Id.
75. Id. at 862.
76. See State Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 678
(1978).
77. Doughty, supra note 65, at 123-24.
78. Id. at 123.
79. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 17, at 684.
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sexual partners."0 A former friend of the employee copied the lists and
mailed the names of 4,000 Florida residents with HIV/AIDS to local
newspapers."' In Illinois, the state legislature implemented a statute
authorizing the state to sift through the Illinois state registry of HIV
infected persons in order to determine the HIV status of state health
care workers.8 2 The statute further authorized the state to notify for-
mer patients of their potential exposure to the virus.
83
In light of these abuses and of the potential for stigmatization
and discrimination in the event of a breach of confidentiality, oppo-
nents of case reporting suggest that the best way to prevent govern-
ment misuse of information is to prohibit the collection of data.84
Unless there are strong safeguards against informational misuse, the
result is that fewer members of at-risk populations will be tested for
HIV. Deterring at-risk populations from the testing process will
significantly hamper public health efforts to accurately monitor the
spread of HIV infection.
VI. HIV SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
The tensions between civil liberties and public health concerns
are deeply rooted. Nonetheless, the debate has recently shifted its
focus. Because we have reached a critical level in the AIDS epidemic,
many AIDS activist organizations and citizens now support state
efforts to monitor the disease. It is widely recognized that in order for
AIDS surveillance to be effective, it must include HIV tracking.
Hence, the current debate has shifted from whether to employ HIV
surveillance at all to which type of surveillance system will best serve
the common good. In light of the sensitive nature of a person's HIV
status, it is important to develop a program that properly addresses
public health concerns as well as the concerns of infected individuals.
In 1999, the CDC released a formal report urging all states to
adopt some form of HIV surveillance system.8" The CDC empha-
sized that the inclusion of HIV surveillance in current tracking
80. Craig Pittman, Mortician Guilty of Revealing AIDS List, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
April 30, 1997, at lB.
81. Id.
82. Doughty, supra note 65, at 134-35 (citing to ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 410, § 325/5.5
(Smith-Hurd 1993)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 179-80.
85. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Guidelines for National Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Case Surveillance, Including Monitoring for Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP., RR-13 (1999). See also Russ Bynum, CDC Urges States to Record HIV Cases, Patient's
Names, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at A12.
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systems was a necessary response to advances in medical technology.86
Due to these medical advances and their positive effect on HIV-
positive persons, the CDC asserted that AIDS surveillance alone does
not accurately depict current epidemiological trends.87 AIDS surveil-
lance will not properly demonstrate the need for increased care and
prevention services for HIV-infected individuals.88 Nor will AIDS
surveillance properly illustrate the dramatic rise in new infections in
women, heterosexuals, and communities of color.89
The CDC recommended that states adopt one of two types of
reporting systems. One system reports an individual's HIV status to
state health officials using the name of the infected person. The alter-
native, less common system, uses a code or method of encryption so
that the identity of the HIV-positive patient remains private. Both
systems involve a balancing of public health concerns against the pri-
vacy interests of patients." As the main goal of any HIV surveillance
system is to protect the public health, the CDC supports any state that
wishes to implement an HIV surveillance program."
A. Names Reporting
Names-based HIV surveillance systems are favored by state
administrative bodies because the programs are easy to implement.
Because states already have names-based systems in place to monitor
incidences of AIDS, imposing a similar system for HIV requires very
few structural adjustments.92 It is inexpensive to implement and,
intuitively, patient names seem to be a logical method of identifi-
cation.93 Under this system, providers or laboratories report the
names of HIV positive individuals to local and/or state health officials
by patient name. Then, health officials encode this information and
provide the data to the CDC.
Several justifications may be offered in support of an HIV sur-
veillance system based on names. First, because this method involves
a fairly simple process, providers are likely to comply with requests for
86. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 85, at 1.
87. Id.
88. Robert Greenwald, AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts, Creating and [sic]
Effective Public Health Response to the Changing Epidemic: Moving to HIV Surveillance by Unique






93. Forbes, supra note 44, at 3.
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information and provide accurate and complete data.94  Second,
names-based case reporting most accurately reflects movement in the
epidemic and, thus, provides the best basis for the allocation of funds
and resources.95 Third, names-based reporting ensures that those in-
fected with HIV will be provided with complete information, care, and
counseling. Finally, reporting the names of patients makes it less like-
ly that a person will be counted more than once should she seek
services at several locations.96 Thus, the integrity of data remains
intact because names reporting significantly reduces the possibility of
duplicate case reports.
Due to the practical need for accurate information on HIV infec-
tion, names-based reporting has earned the support of major health
care authorities including the American Medical Association and the
New England Journal of Medicine.97 In fact, there have been recent
proposals to implement a national system of HIV surveillance by
patient name. 98  It is understood that with the names of infected
individuals, it is easier to link persons to health services and to the
latest treatments.99 Access to patients' names allows providers to eas-
ily contact an individual if necessary.
B. Unique Identifiers
The alternative to a names-based system of HIV surveillance is a
system that encodes the infected individual's medical and personal
information.' Such a system seeks to maintain an individual's
privacy while acquiring the data necessary to track HIV infection.
This type of tracking program is frequently referred to as a unique
identifier system (UI) in reference to the non-name based code used
for identification purposes. A UI is a numeric or alpha-based code
that corresponds to a location or an individual. 1 ' Social Security num-
bers and zip codes are both examples of UI codes. °2
The CDC provided both Maryland and Texas with one-time
$600,000 grants to implement HIV surveillance systems using UI
codes instead of names.0 3 Although their success rates in terms of
94. Id.
95. King County Bd. of Health Res. No. 98-304 (1989) (recommending that the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) be made a reportable condition in Washington State).
96. Greenwald, supra note 88.
97. Forbes, supra note 44, at 3.
98. Greenwald, supra note 88.
99. Id.
100. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 85, at 9.
101. Forbes, supra note 44, at 8.
102. Id.
103. Forbes, supra note 44, at 9. See also Liza Solomon, HIV Surveillance by Non-Name
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accuracy and implementation differed significantly, the experiences of
Maryland and Texas guided the Washington State Board of Health in
making its determination as to which kind of reporting system best
serves public health concerns and best respects individual privacy.' M
In March of 1994, Texas implemented a UI reporting system for
HIV surveillance." 5 The core functions of the Texas HIV surveil-
lance systems were: timely connection to care and services, disease
intervention, support for epidemiological investigations and research,
and support for HIV case findings.10 6 These goals, however, were not
realized in the Texas system under its original construction. Texas
was not successful in its implementation of an HIV surveillance
system based on UT codes.
Texas found that the UI system was unreliable and did not
provide accurate information." °7 The state's system relied upon both
doctors and laboratories to report pertinent patient information to
county health officials for conversion into UI codes. However, many
of the reports from providers and laboratories were incomplete and
missing several elements, making it impossible to construct the UI.10 8
Incomplete reports were excluded from reporting and resulted in inac-
curate HIV case counts. 109 In a time span of three years, an evaluation
revealed that approximately 17,839 reports were incomplete upon
submittal.'
Because the administration of Texas' HIV surveillance system
depended entirely on complete initial reports, the entire system was
undermined when participants were unable to achieve this degree of
accuracy."' Inaccurate reporting made it virtually impossible for
providers to link patients to particular UI codes."' The Texas surveil-
Based Identifier, the Maryland Experience, NASTAD HIV PREVENTION COMMUNITY PLAN-
NING (1998); WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 21.
104. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 21.
105. TEXAS DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 45, at 7 (explaining that the Ul code in Texas
included the individual's last four digits of social security number; month, day and year of birth;
a numeric code for sex; and a numeric code for race/ethnicity).
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id. (beginning in 1995, paper reports missing 3 or more elements and were ineligible




112. Telephone interview with Sharon Hopkins, Senior Epidemiologist at Public Health
Seattle King County (Jan. 25, 2000). Hopkins detailed the process by which Washington devel-
oped its HIV surveillance system. She described the influential roles played by both the Gover-
nor's Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (GACHA) and the Common Ground Group on HIV
Reporting (CG). According to Hopkins, the proposal developed by CG was the system that was
adopted. A key component of the Washington approach is its emphasis on maintaining local
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lance system did not include any mechanism by which providers and
laboratories logged the UI and patient information. This inhibited
the success of the Texas system of partner notification.114 Doctors
were unable to notify the partners of HIV positive persons because
they were unable to identify the patient from an inaccurate UI code.'
The system was dysfunctional because it was unable to support
patient referral and disease intervention services." 6
Due to these problems, Texas replaced the UI system with a
names-based reporting system at the beginning of 1999. 17 According
to the Texas Department of Health, "Because of the limitations inher-
ent in the system, it is unlikely that it could ever provide the informa-
tion needed, no matter how many additional resources were invested
in improving the system." '118
In 1994, Maryland began using a UI reporting system after pro-
posals to adopt a names-based HIV reporting system were defeated in
the state legislature." 9 A key factor in Maryland's decision to imple-
ment a UI system was the potential deterrent effect of names report-
ing.' State officials were concerned that individuals would avoid
getting tested for HIV and delay treatment due to a fear of exposure
should they test positive.
21
The Maryland UI surveillance system, which is still in existence,
differs structurally from Texas' initial UI system. For example, in
Maryland, providers have the sole responsibility for constructing UI
codes. 21 Providers maintain logs that link the UI to the patient's
name.Y2 3 Once constructed and complete, the UI is forwarded to the
control over the names of HIV infected individuals. Because there were concerns that the
statewide registry of names was too accessible to state legislators, names are to be reported locally
to county health departments. It is the responsibility of local health officials, not providers, to
encrypt the data. Names are kept for 90 days in order to ensure that the data is complete and can
be properly converted into a UI.
113. HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIOLOGY PROGRAM, SEATTLE-KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC HEALTH, HIV INFECTION REPORTING: ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND ANALYSIS OF
THE DATA 9 (1998).
114. Hopkins, supra note 112.
115. Id. Hopkins emphasized that by placing the burden of accurate reporting on county
health departments, Washington sought to avoid the problems that plagued the Texas HIV sur-
veillance system. In Texas, both physicians and laboratories failed to provide complete data.
116. Id.
117. Terrence Stutz, State Health Board Adopts Rules Requiring That HIV Patients' Names
Be Reported, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 21, 1998, at 36A.
118. TEXAS DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 45, at 21.
119. Solomon, supra note 103 (discussing two defeated legislative proposals, one in 1992
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laboratories.'24 The laboratories report the UI and test result to the
state health department.'25 Although the Maryland UI HIV tracking
program is structurally different from that of Texas, the state found
itself similarly plagued by problems related to inaccuracy and incom-
pleteness.'26
A CDC survey illustrated that both the Maryland and the Texas
UI systems fell below performance standards.'27 When compared to
names-based reporting systems, the Maryland UI system was accurate
approximately 50% of the time.12 The Texas case reporting system
had a startlingly low accuracy rate of 26%.129
The problems experienced in Maryland and Texas possibly
resulted from the complex structure of the encryption. Because UI
systems "require several independent sources of information to pro-
duce the unique coded identifier, they often suffer from incomplete or
inaccurate reporting."' 130  Between 16-43% of the reports in Maryland
and Texas were missing at least one piece of data necessary to con-
struct the UI.'
The viability of a reporting system depends upon its accuracy in
reporting data. Although Texas abandoned attempts to perfect its UI
reporting system, Maryland sought to correct the accuracy and com-
pleteness problems that plagued its program. 3 2 The ACLU points to
the Maryland surveillance program as an illustration of a successful UI
reporting system. 133  Since its inception, the Maryland reporting
124. Id.
125 Id.
126. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 39.
127. Id. at 21. See also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Evaluation of HIV
Surveillance Through the Use of Non-Name Identifiers-Maryland and Texas, 46 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1254, 1255 (1998) (identifying evaluation criteria as "the proportion
of reports with full UI codes, timeliness and completeness of HIV reporting, and potential for
matching the Ul-based case reports to alternate databases.").
128. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 39.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 38. See also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 127, at 1255
(explaining that Maryland and Texas both constructed the UI code using last four digits of the
patient's Social Security number, date of birth, one-digit code for race/ethnicity, and one-digit
code for sex).
131. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 19.
132. See generally American Civil Liberties Union Report, The Maryland Lesson, Conduct-
ing Effective HIV Surveillance with Unique Identifiers (visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http://www.aclu.
org/issues/aids/mdnamereport.html>.
133. Id. ("The UI program gives Maryland the data it needs to track HIV infection in the
State and to guide decisions about AIDS funding and prevention efforts. Officials at the Mary-
land AIDS Administration are pleased that the Unique Identifier system has enjoyed consider-
able community support and is thought to create an environment in which individuals are more
willing to be tested and learn their HIV status.").
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system has improved and experienced rising accuracy rates."' Mary-
land's UI completion rate is now almost 97% for state-funded sites."'
The Maryland AIDS Administration continues to promote the viabil-
ity HIV tracking by UI as opposed to names.'36
The Maryland experience indicates that the implementation of a
UI system is not a hopeless endeavor. Implementation of any tracking
system will require a large input of time and energy before it functions
at an acceptable rate of completion. Ultimately, the issue of which
system is preferable depends on which approach better balances the
interests of the infected against public health concerns.
C. Choosing Between the Two Programs
The numerous factors favoring names reporting require examin-
ation. Despite arguments to the contrary, HIV surveillance by patient
name will not reflect movement in the epidemic more accurately than
a properly executed surveillance system based on UI code.'37
Problems of inaccuracy and duplicated case reports are not con-
fined to UI surveillance systems. Rather, duplication also poses a
problem in names-based reporting states.138 If a patient seeks treat-
ment at more than one location, it is possible that two case reports will
be generated. This type of duplication may be greatly reduced in a
system that constructs a unique code for each individual who tests
positive for HIV.'39 Because the information used to construct a UI
code is unique for each individual, there is little likelihood that dupli-
cation will occur even if the patient seeks care at multiple locations.
Proponents of names-based reporting assert that it enhances
partner notification. Where cases are indexed by patient name, health
officials can make numerous attempts to uncover the names of an
infected person's partners. 4 However, patient names are not essential
134. Id.
135. See Greenwald, supra note 88. Greenwald notes, however, that the rate of inaccura-
cies are lower in private testing sites. Id.
136. See Liza Solomon & Georges Benjamin, Letter to the Editor, 338 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
626, 626 (1998) ("Given the traditional American concern about the privacy of medical records
and the very real potential for discrimination against people infected with HIV, we believe that
our system provides the benefits of epidemiologic monitoring of the epidemic and averts the cre-
ation of barriers to HIV testing and treatment among those concerned about confidentiality. We
suggest that states considering HIV surveillance investigate non-name-based HIV-surveillance
systems as an important option.").
137. Doughty, supra note 65, at 166.
138. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 47, at 737.
139. Id. at 737-38.
140. Grant Nash Colfax & Andrew B. Bindman, Health Benefits and Risks of Reporting
HIV-Infected Individuals by Name, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 876, 877 n.6 (June 1998).
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to successful partner notification.' 4 In fact, partner notification is
most successful when it is performed in an entirely voluntary and
anonymous manner. 42  Individuals are more apt to participate in
partner notification programs if they understand their medical profile
will be confidential.
From a practical standpoint, UI reporting is not a significantly
more complex method of tracking HIV infection. The technology
employed to encrypt patient data is not uncommon. Encryption of
patient information is currently used in AIDS surveillance. Although
the incidence of AIDS is reportable by name at the state level, state
officials currently encrypt AIDS medical data before reporting it to the
CDC. Thus, the technology to encode patient data is readily available
to state health officials.
Despite the arguments in favor of names reporting, there are
compelling reasons to take the alternative route and adopt a UI system
of surveillance. Although HIV surveillance by UI code is a more
laborious method of tracking, 144 the increased amount of time required
to encrypt patient medical information must be weighed against the
privacy rights of infected individuals. Because of the extremely sensi-
tive medical data, a system that announces the names of infected indi-
viduals is unnecessarily intrusive. Names-based HIV case reporting
systems create registries in which the names of infected individuals are
compiled. 4 In the event of a breach of confidentiality, the individ-
ual's privacy interests would be violated, resulting in potentially
irreparable harm.'4 6
Several organizations, including the ACLU and the National
Association of People with AIDS (NAPWA), oppose names-based
reporting systems. 4 7 According to the ACLU, names-based reporting
is not a solution to the AIDS crisis.148 The organization asserts that
the CDC underestimates the deterrent effects of names reporting on
voluntary testing.'49 According to the ACLU, names reporting causes
141. Id.
142. See infra Part V for a discussion regarding partner notification in Washington State.
143. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIVI
AIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 76 (spring 1998) (discussing studies regarding
confidentiality and contact tracing).
144. Hopkins, supra note 112.
145. Greenwald, supra note 88.
146. Id. (noting that at present time, not all states have laws that safeguard the confiden-
tiality of HIV related information).





significant deterrence in those populations most effected by the AIDS
crisis.' In a recent response to the CDC draft guidelines, the ACLU
cited numerous studies illustrating the deterrent effects of names
reporting among high-risk populations.'
In 1997, NAPWA issued a strong statement against the use of
names in HIV surveillance.' NAPWA offered fourteen criteria nec-
essary to an effective system of HIV surveillance." 3 Included within
these criteria was data encryption. 4 Despite the organization's zea-
lous support of HIV surveillance, it asserted that HIV surveillance by
UI code is the only tracking method that protects the patient's confi-
dentiality and privacy.' According to NAPWA, HIV surveillance
systems must adapt to the changing needs of society in order to be
effective.' 56 "[Slurveillance systems should be constantly re-evaluated
to determine if the goal of applying surveillance data to meaningful
education, programs, planning and resource allocation is happening.
If not, these systems should be discontinued."''
Similarly, in 1998, Gay Men's Health Crisis (GMHC) issued a
position paper in which it asserted its strong belief in the benefits of
HIV surveillance as a method of increasing knowledge concerning the
AIDS epidemic. 5 In its recommendations to New York State,
GMHC called upon the state to evaluate the experiences of Maryland
and Texas and implement a unique identifier system. Encoding infor-
mation, the organization asserted, is the best possible way to ensure
patients' privacy. 9
150. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV Testing Among Populations
at Risk for HIV Infection-Nine States, 47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1086
(1998) ("The findings indicate that in these populations' knowledge of state HIV reporting poli-
cies was low, and fear of a positive HIV test result and a lack of perceived risk for HIV infection
were the most common deterrents to testing in all risk groups. However, untested men who have
sex with men (MSM) who resided in states with name-based reporting cited concerns about
reporting as a reason they had not tested more often than untested MSM in states without name-
based reporting.").
151. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 88 (explaining that the 1996 Reed study conducted at
anonymous and confidential sites in Los Angeles found that 86% of respondents would not seek
testing if the names of those testing HIV positive were reported to government health agencies).
152. See National Association of People with AIDS, NAPWA Position Paper on HIV Sur-
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There is strong support and good reasons to develop HIV sur-
veillance systems that employ unique identifiers instead of names.
The deterrent effects of names-based reporting undermine the pur-
pose of early reporting. If the purpose of a reporting system is to
prevent the spread of AIDS, it certainly is not accomplished in a
society that intentionally or unintentionally releases the names of those
infected with HIV. "In addition, deterring people from testing means
that name reporting cannot provide the most accurate, comprehensive,
representative, complete, and timely data possible about the course of
the epidemic.""16 The harm that would result from the release of this
information should not be underestimated. A system that takes into
account the sensitive nature of an individual's HIV status will more
effectively serve the common good.
VII. A CHALLENGE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE
BOARD OF HEALTH
"Laws that assure confidentiality and protect people from
discrimination are said to reduce resistance, while laws that require
reporting of HIV test results, or other stigmatizing measures, deter
testing and other behavioral changes urged by public health author-
ities. '  The challenge before the Washington State Board of Health
was to create an HIV reporting system that balanced public health
concerns against privacy while maintaining a level of accuracy accept-
able under CDC standards.162 This section will describe the manner
in which Washington approached this daunting task. Part A outlines
the steps leading to the drafting of the Washington regulations. Part
B details the various aspects of the Washington approach and how
these aspects address private and public interests.
A. Drafting the Regulations
From the outset, the topic of HIV surveillance in Washington
sparked a heated debate between public health officials and AIDS
activist organizations. 63 AIDS activists stressed that if a surveillance
system was to be implemented, the least intrusive tracking method
was necessary. AIDS organizations and community groups, which
predominantly supported HIV surveillance, argued adamantly in favor
of a confidential surveillance system based on UI codes. They feared
160. Greenwald, supra note 88, at 16.
161. Burris, supra note 62, at 833.
162. See generally Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 85.
163. Warren King, Controversy Rages Over Reporting of HIV-Positive Names, SEATTLE
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1998, at Al.
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that a names-based system would deter people from being tested and
inhibit efforts to thwart the spread of AIDS. If people understood the
government was compiling their medical data, they would avoid the
testing process and delay necessary medical treatment.
Health officials, however, were not immediately responsive to the
concerns of activist groups. The Texas experience cast doubt upon
the viability of an HIV surveillance system based on UI codification.
Health officials were convinced that only a names-based reporting
system would provide the level of accuracy and dependability crucial
to successful HIV surveillance.164
It was not until 1997 that the Washington State Department of
Health embarked upon a nearly two-year project to revise the state's
methods of tracking infectious diseases.'65 Not surprisingly, particu-
larly in light of recent recommendations from the CDC, the main item
on the agenda was HIV surveillance. To address this issue, the Gov-
ernors' Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (GACHA) appointed a task
force to determine whether the time was right to implement HIV
surveillance in Washington.'66 More specifically, the task force was
asked to ascertain which surveillance method, names or UI Codes,
would best serve the interests of Washington State.
167
The task force was originally composed solely of GACHA mem-
bers. 68 However, in order obtain the broadest possible input regard-
ing HIV surveillance, the task force was expanded to include members
of AIDS organizations and citizen groups. 169 A series of public forums
was held and the public was invited to share its comments with the
task force. 7° The group met regularly to discuss the various systems
available and how each alternative would work in Washington State.'
7'
The task force devised a list of specific objectives for a successful
surveillance system.172 First, a surveillance system should aim to make
the highest possible percentage of people aware of their HIV status.173
Second, such a system should help determine the movement and
extent of HIV infection.'74 Third, the system must connect as many
164. Id.
165. Washington State Dept. of Health, supra note 51.
166. See generally GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL OF HIV/AIDS, HIV REPORTING
TASK FORCE REPORT (Jan. 27, 1998) [hereinafter GACHA].





172. Id. at 1-2.
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id. at 2.
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people as possible with health care services. 75 Fourth, there must be
an accurate determination as to how many AIDS cases there are and
thus what resources are necessary. 76 Fifth, a successful HIV surveil-
lance system must expend as few resources as possible in accomplish-
ing these tasks)7 7 Additionally, the group determined that a goal of a
reporting system should be to "maintain the highest levels of privacy
and confidentiality for HIV+ [sic] people."'
78
The task force found that AIDS surveillance in Washington, in
light of advances in medical treatments, was no longer effective. The
time had come to implement a system of asymptomatic HIV case
reporting in Washington State. 179 AIDS reporting alone was less use-
ful because AIDS develops more than ten years after the time of initial
infection.' As a result, AIDS surveillance could not accurately reveal
patterns in disease.' The task force also found that for many at-risk
individuals, the fear of public exposure and stigmatization remained a
major factor behind the decision to take an HIV test. 2
GACHA performed a thorough analysis of the viability of each
tracking system in addressing both public health concerns and the
fears of at-risk individuals.8 3 Forwarding its complete findings to
Governor Gary Locke for his consideration, GACHA recommended
that Washington State implement an HIV surveillance system based
on UI codes.8 4 According to GACHA, factors that mitigated in favor
of names reporting included: (1) providers' familiarity with names
reporting systems, (2) the traditional acceptance of names reporting as
an effective method of disease surveillance, and (3) the high probabil-
ity that infected individuals are properly linked with care and counsel-
ing with the names-based reporting system.' However, GACHA
found that the best way to balance public health concerns against the
rights of infected persons was to impose a system of HIV surveillance






179. See Alonzo Plough, The Time Is Now Right for HIV Reporting, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
29, 1997, at B7 (discussing the limits of current surveillance methods in Washington and the
need for improved methods of partner notification and outreach efforts).
180. Hopkins, supra note 112.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See generally GACHA, supra note 166.
184. Id. at 19.




The task force found that the use of UI codes in an HIV surveil-
lance system would address patients' fears regarding the confidenti-
ality of their medical information. "In order to help the greatest
number of people learn their HIV status and access care, it is vital that
public health maintain a solid and cooperative relationship with the
HIV/AIDS community and those at greatest risk for HIV
infection."' 87
The GACHA report stressed that it was not enough to empha-
size the simplicity of names reporting without balancing it against its
potentially deterrent effects.' 8  As suggested previously, names
reporting may cause high-risk populations to avoid the testing proc-
ess." 9 "This is of particular concern in Washington, where the HIV/
AIDS epidemic continues to be driven primarily by gay and bisexual
men. '"190 In order to thwart the spread of AIDS, it is crucial that these
communities are ensured access to health care and confidential medi-
cal testing.
While the GACHA task force clearly recognized the need to
balance public health concerns against the rights of infected individ-
uals, the final plan for an HIV surveillance system aimed at achieving
this balance was developed at the local level. In King County, the
most populated county in the state, local health officials and concerned
members of the community formed a group to discuss HIV surveil-
lance.' 9 ' The coalition, The Common Ground Work Group (CG),
agreed that the implementation of HIV surveillance was a necessary
step in the fight against AIDS.'92 The divisive issue remained the
proper method of surveillance.'93
CG met only a few times, but it worked diligently to come to a
successful compromise.'94 The group recognized the limitations and
problems inherent in both HIV tracking systems.'95 Ultimately, it
found that a surveillance system based entirely upon either names or
Uls would not serve the needs of the community.'96 Rather, CG
recommended to the Department of Health (DOH) that Washington
adopt a system of HIV surveillance that included names reporting at
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id. at 13.
189. Id.
190. Id. See also Hopkins, supra note 112.
191. COMMON GROUND WORKGROUP, A REPORT FROM COMMON GROUND ON HIV
REPORTING 1 (Jan. 13, 1999).






Seattle University Law Review
the local level and the conversion of patient information into UI codes
prior to reporting data to state health officials.'97 This compromise
placed the burden of compiling accurate case reports on county health
officials, instead of on providers as in the Texas system, while uphold-
ing the privacy interests of patients by prohibiting the release of
sensitive medical information to state government officials. 9 '
The CG recommendation proved a desirable compromise to all
interested parties. On July 14, 1999, after two years of planning and
debate, the DOH voted unanimously to impose a hybrid system of
asymptomatic HIV case surveillance in Washington.'99 On September
1, 1999, local health departments began reporting HIV surveillance
data to the state in the form of UI codes.2 °°
B. Characteristics of the Hybrid Model
An analysis of the key aspects of the Washington regulations
illustrates the state's success in setting a proper balance between
public health and civil liberties. First, the names of infected individ-
uals are recorded for only a brief period of time. Under the regula-
tions, in the event of a positive HIV test, laboratories and providers
must forward a patient's name and vital information to the local health
department.2 °' Upon completion of the case record, the local health
department is responsible for encrypting the name and demographic
information into a UI code.202 Names will not be kept longer than
ninety days.20 3
This ninety-day period is an important aspect of the Washington
regulations because it gives county health officials enough time to
properly construct a UI code.204 During this period, officials have the
opportunity to contact providers if there is inadequate information in
the case report.20 ' Because doctors do not have the patient codes, the
county health officials must be able to refer to the patient by name
when seeking this necessary data.206 In this manner, the Washington
system seeks to avoid the problems of inaccuracy and incompleteness
that plagued the Texas HIV surveillance system.
197. Id.
198. Hopkins, supra note 112.
199. King County Public Health, The "Washington Model" for HIV Case Reporting (visited
Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.metrokc.gov/health/apu/namerep/washmod.htm>.
200. Hopkins, supra note 112.
201. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-101-105,246-101-110.
202. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-076.
203. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-101-520(1)(b), (c).
204. Hopkins, supra note 112; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-101-520(4).
205. Id.
206. Hopkins, supra note 112.
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After the ninety-day period, the patient's information is
destroyed." 7 The encoded data is then reported to state officials who
provide subsequent reports to the CDC. In order to respect the
privacy interests of infected persons, Washington State officials never
receive a list of names of HIV-positive individuals."' The purpose of
prohibiting the release of names to state officials is to alleviate com-
munity concerns regarding privacy by preventing a centralized state
registry of names. This concept is unique among the states that
employ HIV surveillance by UI code.
Second, as a means of encouraging voluntary HIV testing, the
Regulations provide both confidential and anonymous testing
options. 20 9 Both the CDC and the Washington State Board of Health
recognize the importance of anonymous testing as a method of encour-
aging HIV testing. 210 Under the regulations, persons considering test-
ing will be provided with the option to test confidentially or in an
anonymous manner. Should an individual chose the confidential
option, her name will be protected by the UI system. Where an indi-
vidual opts to test anonymously, her information will not be reported
anywhere.1 2
Anonymous testing ensures that the identity of the individual
will not be linked to the result of the test.1 3 Public locations that
perform anonymous HIV tests are available in every region of Wash-
ington. 21' A person may also elect to test anonymously by using a
home testing kit.215 However, once an individual seeks treatment for
HIV, a case report will be generated and subsequently forwarded to
county health officials. 21
6
Confidential testing is different from anonymous testing in that
the individual will be linked to the test results. For example, in the
context of HIV surveillance, "confidential" means that a person's
information will be kept private. In other words, the identity of the
infected person will be reported, but in a private manner and only to
designated public health officials. After a 90-day period, the patient's
207. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-101-520(1)(b). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-
100-072 (regarding destruction of information related to identified partners).
208. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-101-520(4).
209. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 246-100-209, 246-100-206.
210. WASHINGTON STATE BD. OF HEALTH, supra note 4, at 22.
211. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-209.
212. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-206(1)(a).
213. Id.
214. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-209(1)(c)(i).
215. Id.
216. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-100-206(1)(a).
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name is expunged and the case report is destroyed.1 7 Any potential
misgivings about the integrity of such a system may be alleviated due
to the fact that it is not possible to convert the codes back into names.
Hence, the patient's identity receives the maximum degree of protec-
tion under the regulations.
Third, the regulations provide safeguards against government
misuse of information.2"' Access to the data is limited to local health
officials who are required to sign periodic confidentiality agree-
ments.219 Breaches of confidentiality are subject to both criminal and
civil penalties.22 Any breaches must be reported to state officers and
are subject to investigation and penalty by both state and local health
officials. The CDC assists state health departments in any investiga-
tory processes and recommends security improvements where neces-
sary.221 Recent laws increase the penalties for improper disclosure of
medical and related health information by making violations gross
misdemeanors as punishable by one year in prison and civil fines of up
to $10,000.222
Fourth, partner notification, a key element to the success of any
HIV surveillance system, is provided in a manner that maintains the
individual's privacy interests by restricting notification to situations
where both the patient and the provider consent to the use of this
service."' Because infected individuals "may be members of socially-
disfavored [sic] groups such as sex workers, injection drug users, or
gays, partner notification is a particularly sensitive issue. Disclosure
of one's HIV status can result in social stigma among their family and
friends." '224 Among socially disfavored groups, the danger of any
potential social risk may outweigh the benefit of medical knowledge.
217. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-101-520(1)(b). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-
100-072(5)(c) (mandating that any information related to partners also be destroyed).
218. Hopkins, supra note 112. While several pieces of personal data are necessary to create
a UI code, the codes cannot be analyzed to reveal a patient's name. The unique manner in which
the information is codified enables local health departments to determine if the individual's data
has been previously recorded, thereby eliminating the possibility of duplicate case reports.
219. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-101-520(5).
220. Id. Seealso WASH. REV. CODE§ 70.24.105.
221. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 85, at 10; WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 246-101-520(6).
222. RCW 70.24.022; RCW 9A.20.021 (increasing penalties for unauthorized disclosure
of HIV data reports and other STD reports); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-101-520(5).
223. See generally Ronald Bayer, & Kathleen E. Toomey, HIV Prevention and the Two
Faces of Partner Notification, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1158 (1992).
224. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 17, at 679.
[Vol. 24:941
HIV Surveillance
The Washington regulations take into account the perception of
this social risk. The regulations allow for notification only where the
patient voluntarily consents to this process. 2 ' An HIV-positive per-
son has the option to personally inform her sexual or needle-sharing
partners of her HIV status but may otherwise request the assistance of
her provider. Partner notification is the responsibility of the doctor,
but the doctor may request assistance from the local health depart-
ment when performing this task.226
Because partner notification involves complex issues of privacy
and social consequences, the names of the HIV infected individual are
not revealed to partners absent written patient consent.227 Rather, the
provider or local health personnel recommends to the partners that he
or she be tested for HIV.228
VIII. CONCLUSION
Monitoring AIDS alone no longer serves the common goal of
thwarting the spread of AIDS. New advances in medical technology
and therapy have proven to be successful methods of keeping HIV-
infected individuals alive longer. Today, HIV-positive people live
healthier and more productive lives. In order to properly understand
the extent of the epidemic and utilize our resources in the most effi-
cient manner, surveillance must be expanded to include HIV infec-
tions. Moreover, HIV surveillance will link HIV-positive people to
vital medical services.
In light of the sensitivity of AIDS-related information and the
harmful effects of improper disclosure, the best method of surveillance
is achieved through the use of UI codes. Names-based reporting sys-
tems do not provide adequate safeguards and may deter high-risk
groups from the testing process.
The Washington State regulations illustrate the proper balance
between public health and civil liberties. The new regulations are
advantageous in a number of ways. They promote privacy and confi-
dentiality in a manner that does not adversely affect the integrity of
the data. They promote AIDS awareness and encourage a sensitive
and informed response to issues involving HIV and AIDS. They
provide safeguards against informational misuse and confidentiality
problems. The unique codification procedure greatly reduces the pos-
sibility of duplicate or inaccurate case reports. Because UI codes
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cannot be linked to the patient source, fears of social stigmatization are
alleviated. Most notably, HIV surveillance by UI code will not deter
people from the testing process and, therefore, may inhibit the spread
of HIV among those who would otherwise remain ignorant of their
HIV status.
